Three recent cases that deal with the foreseeability of illness that follows negligence by the defendant illustrate the different approaches that may be taken by the courts. In Six Continents Retail Ltd v Mark Hone (29 June 2005) the Court of Appeal, headed by the Master of the Rolls, upheld the claim of an employee (H) that he was entitled to recover damages for psychiatric injury caused by stress that had resulted from his excessive workload as the manager of a licensed house. He had told his employer that he was unable to deal with his work load without working excessively long hours (about 90 per week) and was tired. Although H's employer had accepted that H needed an assistant manager it had failed to appoint one. H collapsed with chest pains and suffered psychiatric injury for which he claimed damages. The trial judge held that the injury to H's health from stress at work had been reasonably foreseeable and that S had failed to comply with his employer's duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that, without H's written agreement, he did not work more than 48 hours a week in accordance with the Working Time Regulations 1998. Indeed he had known that H was working about 90 hours a week. Accordingly, the employer was liable in damages for the foreseeable injury that followed.
The Court of Appeal said that the earlier case of Barber v Somerset CC [2002 ] EWCA Civ 76, (2002 PIQR 241 applied and held that the trial judge had used the proper test to determine on the evidence before the court that there had been sufficiently plain indications of impending harm to health for a reasonable employer to take action to prevent it. Here there had been clear indications of foreseeable injury to H but S had not taken the necessary and appropriate steps to prevent this.
By contrast, in the cases of Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd and Another (and five similar cases heard together) the Court of Appeal, with Lord Phillips (LCJ) presiding, reversed the decision of the first instance judge who had held that the claimants' employers were liable in damages for psychiatric injury resulting from the claimants' anxiety and fear that their pleural plaques (caused by exposure to asbestos) could cause a serious future disease. The Court of Appeal (with Smith LJ dissenting on liability) held that although the claimants' pleural plaques were caused by the defendants' negligence they were not significant enough to justify a claim in negligence (Cartledge v Jopling [1963] AC 758 applied). No claim could be brought for the chance of contracting a future disease if that was not caused by a physical injury that had been proved to exist. Fear of future illness was not an independent head of damage; Lynch v Knight (1861) 9 HLC 577 applied. English Law did not recognise a duty not to cause anxiety and the judge had been wrong to decide that the presence of asbestos fibres in the body (which was evidenced by the existence of the plaques) could found a cause of action. Church v MOD (unreported, 23 February 1984) and Sykes v MOD (unreported, 19 March 1984) and Patterson v MOD (unreported, 29 July 1986) were all doubted. A claimant, G, who had developed a depressive illness could not recover damages for psychiatric injury on the basis that he had been negligently exposed to the risk of contracting the disease if he had not in fact contracted it. A claimant could not recover damages for psychiatric injury caused by anxiety at the risk of sustaining a disease where a person of reasonable fortitude would not have reacted in that way.
Here the claimant had progressed from being one of the "worried well" to being worried and unwellbut this was not a compensatable injury! The issue of reasonable foreseeability was the deciding issue in the unusual and very sad case of Briefly, the facts were that at the age of eight weeks the claimant was taken to his GP's surgery for two reasons: (1) he was suffering from a second perianal abscess (the second since his birth) and (2) he was due to undergo his routine immunisations which included inoculation against polio. It was agreed that perianal abscess is an extraordinarily rare occurrence in an infant. The defendant GP examined the claimant and correctly diagnosed the abscess for which he prescribed antibiotics, but he did not consider the claimant to be systemically unwell and found nothing that in his judgment contra-indicated giving the immunisations that day and so advised the claimant's parents. However, he did not inform them of two matters that the trial judge found he should have done. Namely, (1) that the presentation of recurrent perianal abscess was very unusual and (2) that the abscess might require surgery within a few days.
The trial judge further found that if the parents had been told this they would not have proceeded with the immunisations that day but would have waited to see what happened with the abscess -i.e. whether it healed or needed surgery. The claimant having been immunised, the abscess unfortunately worsened within a few days. The GP referred him to hospital where the abscess was surgically excised and drained. Although the operation was uneventful, a few days later the claimant became seriously ill and was paralysed and diagnosed as having developed vaccine acquired paralytic polio (VAPP). He is seriously disabled.
At trial the medical evidence for the claimant from Professor Banatvala (an eminent virologist) asserted that the surgery and contraction of VAPP were associated (provocation polio). It was the claimant's case that but for alleged negligence the immunisations would have been postponed and the injury avoided. The defendant alleged there was no such known causal connection and that what had happened was the manifestation of a rare but recognised risk of polio inoculation and that the perianal abscess was an unconnected coincidence. The judge rejected this explanation and held that the one event was consequent upon the other. However, he also held that it was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the claimant would contract VAPP as a result of being inoculated while suffering from a perianal abscess. Notwithstanding, the judge found for the claimant on the basis that but for the defendant's negligence the parents would have delayed the inoculation and if it had been postponed VAPP would have been avoided. It was not necessary that the mechanism be foreseen provided the outcome was foreseeable in general terms.
On appeal, (and perhaps somewhat surprisingly in the light of the House of Lords controversial and stated policy-driven decision in Chester v Afshar [2005] AC 134 that deals with causation following a negligently obtained consent to a procedure that would have been delayed) the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision. Giving the judgment of the court, Waller LJ defined the primary legal issue as follows: was the breach of duty in respect of which the judge had found negligence "relevant" in relation to the damage alleged to have resulted? The Court of Appeal held that it was not "relevant" because the GP could not have reasonably been expected to foresee VAPP as a consequence of his failure to explain the matters which it was found he should have explained to the claimant's parents:
"The maximum any competent GP could have foreseen was that if Hamish had an adverse reaction to the vaccination he would have had a greater degree of discomfort as a result of possible surgery."
The Court of Appeal applied a dictum from Beldam LJ in the case of Brown v Lewisham H A (1999) Lloyd's Rep (Med) 110 at 117: "… it must be shown that the injury suffered by the patient is within the risk from which it was the doctor's duty to protect him. If it is not, the breach is not a relevant breach of duty."
The court held it was not foreseeable that by having the inoculation while having the perianal abscess the claimant was at a greater risk of developing VAPP than if he had had the inoculation after the abscess was healed.
Although this is a reasoned legalistic approach on foreseeability and causation (and hard cases tend to make for bad law), in my view, it is not consistent with the approach taken by the House of Lords in their much criticised decision in Chester v Afshar which held that a properly informed consent was so vital and important that where it was denied, it should found a claim in damages irrespective of former well established rules on causation. It held that it was no longer necessary for a claimant to prove that but for the failure of informed consent he or she would never have undergone the procedure at some time in the future to recover damages when harm results from a procedure carried out without appropriately obtained consent.
Accordingly, we must wait and see whether this case will go to the House of Lords, and if it is, how a differently constituted House will choose to deal with the thorny issue of foreseeable risk and causation.
